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This paper examines the impact of microenterprise credit programs on class 
structure mobility in developing countries.  The paper develops a model that 
endogenously generates an eight-fold class structure.  Class membership is 
determined by optimal choice of labour activity, which is a function of access to 
credit and human capital endowments.  Predictions from the model suggest that 
better access to credit will foster upward class mobility among self-employed 
entrepreneurs, and that this upward class mobility will be accentuated among 
entrepreneurs with high levels of human capital.  Theoretical predictions from 
the model are compared with data on class structure mobility collected first-
hand in western Guatemala.  Empirical results show that upward class structure 
mobility increases substantially with access to credit, and also suggest that the 
combined effect of innate entrepreneurial ability and credit access has a greater 
impact on upward class structure mobility than the interaction between formal 
schooling and credit access. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The well-documented success of microenterprise credit programs in recent years has led 
to an explosion of interest in their use as a tool for alleviating poverty and generating 
economic growth in both developing and transitional economies.1    Evidence of this 
unbridled enthusiasm for such programs occurred at a summit on microenterprise lending 
sponsored by the Clinton Administration in January 1997.  At this summit a consortium 
of international aid agencies, commercial banks, and governmental authorities agreed on 
a plan to direct $23.6 billion toward providing access to credit to 100 million 
impoverished households by the year 2005.2   While numerous statistics have been 
compiled regarding the impressive participation and repayment rates realised of many 
microenterprise lending programs, there is a critical need for research that examines the 
changes in economic behaviour of loan recipients after they obtain access to this credit.   
This paper seeks to make a contribution in this area by examining the impact of 
newfound access to credit on the class structure mobility among loan recipients.  
Specifically, this paper develops a model which predicts potential differences in upward 
class structure mobility between loan recipients with different levels of human capital.   
It then compares the predictions from the model with data showing the class mobility of 
358 entrepreneurs in western Guatemala after the introduction of microenterprise lending 
within the region.   
 Though some may have eschewed an economic analysis of class structure 
mobility for its roots in Marxist ideology,3 policy makers concerned with developing and 
transitional economies have ample reason to share much of this literature's concern over 
the apparent immutability of class structures in many nations.  The perpetuation of stark 
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divisions between social classes--between large holders of capital and wage earners, 
between salaried professionals and the unemployed--may have negative impacts on 
societal welfare for a number of reasons:  The first and perhaps most obvious is the 
societal tension and political destabilisation that results as wage earners organise against 
owners of capital in conflict over shares of value-added created in the production process.  
A class structure consisting of a few large holders of capital is also likely to foster the 
emergence of monopolies and forestall the benefits that accrue from competition between 
large numbers of enterprises.  The new growth theory has brought to light an additional 
benefit of an economy characterised by broadly-based capital holdings and large numbers 
of firms:  Innovation and the creation of new ideas and techniques are now seen as a 
central cause of economic growth [Romer, 1990]; in a competitive economy 
characterised by a large number of entrepreneurs, such innovation may be more likely to 
occur.  Finally, given the potential for moral hazard in the workplace, the hierarchical 
structure of a large firm creates a principal-agent network of immense complexity, as 
well as significant welfare losses in the form of supervision costs.  In contrast, a self-
employed entrepreneur whose output directly enters his own utility function does not 
require supervision or incentives to attain an optimum level of work effort.4   
 Roemer [1982] was the first to build a model which endogenously derived a class 
structure in a capitalist economy based on unequal distribution of capital.  Applying 
Roemer's model to a sample of five hundred villages in West Bengal, Bardhan [1982] 
showed that a class structure similar to that depicted by Roemer could be found within 
rural Indian society.5 
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    Eswaran and Kotwal [1986] add an additional dimension to Roemer's model: 
imperfect information in the form of monitoring costs.  In their model of agrarian class 
structure, they assume that capitalists (agricultural landholders) must supervise their 
workers, who prefer leisure to labour, and therefore have an inherent tendency to shirk.  
They achieve class formation as a function of access to physical capital, and from the 
non-substitutability of hired labour for own labour.  For example, a self-cultivator 
(middle class) refrains from hiring a wage labourer at the point when the marginal 
productivity of labour on his plot equals the going wage rate because the time-cost of 
supervision by the self-cultivator must be added to the direct cost of hired labour. 
 The theoretical portion of this research begins in the framework of Eswaran and 
Kotwal [1986], but adds to their work by suggesting that class structure is not determined 
by physical capital alone, but by the combined interaction of physical and human capital.  
Recent sociological analyses of class structure such as Wright [1997] have begun to place 
an increasing emphasis on human capital as a determinant of class membership.  The 
inclusion of human capital in the analysis of class structure in developing countries has 
become more important in recent decades.  Centuries or even decades ago, ownership of 
large amounts of land or capital may have constituted a necessary and sufficient 
condition for membership in an upper class.  Today, however, income-generating 
potential is increasingly characterised by an individual's ability to interact with modern 
technology and ideas.  Clearly this ability is a function of the human capital embodied in 
a worker's labour.   
 Further motivation for including human capital rather than only physical capital 
or land in a model of class structure is its increasing importance in light of the heavy 
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migration to the large urban areas in developing countries.  The urban share of the Third 
World's population tripled in the middle half of the 20th century, increasing from 9.3 per 
cent in 1925 to 28.0 per cent in 1975 [J. Williamson, 1988].  Especially in an urban 
context, human capital may be equally important a determinant of income-generating 
capability as physical capital.  Thus, relative to the previously cited works that place their 
analysis of class structure in an agrarian context, this analysis of class structure is 
applicable to a more general and more modern developing country environment. 
 The first theoretical result of this research is that class structure mobility increases 
significantly with the provision of access to credit.  Access to credit has this effect since 
through enterprise capitalisation, it changes an agent's optimal mode of labour activity.  
For example, theoretical results of this research show that access to credit fosters 
movement out of self-employment and into labour supervision. This result is confirmed 
by first-hand survey data on class structure mobility collected in conjunction with 
FUNDAP, a microenterprise credit program operating in western Guatemala.  As a result, 
empirical results from the Guatemalan survey data corroborate hypotheses developed in 
the present paper and in previous work with respect to the positive effect of expanded 
access to credit on upward class structure mobility. 
 Additional results of the paper focus on effect of human capital in the form of 
formal schooling on class structure mobility.   Theoretical results derived in this paper 
predict that individuals with higher levels of human capital will expand employment 
within their enterprises more rapidly if more human capital lowers the time cost of 
supervision and administration in an enterprise.  However, there are different components 
to human capital.  While one component of an entrepreneur's human capital comes from 
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innate managerial ability, another component of an entrepreneur's human capital comes in 
the form of formal schooling.  Formal skills such as reading, writing and solving 
mathematical problems are likely to augment an entrepreneur's innate managerial skills to 
increase managerial efficiency.   
 Interestingly, the Guatemalan data used in this study suggest that it is these less-
measurable characteristics of managerial ability rather than formal schooling which 
interact with access to credit to foster upward class mobility.  These characteristics of 
human capital are difficult to identify, but may include personal attributes such as 
Schumpeterian entrepreneurial drive, technical expertise within a given area of business, 
or strong relational skills.  
 The rest of this chapter is organised as follows:  Section II develops a model from 
which membership by all agents in the economy in one of eight classes is endogenously 
derived from a vector of exogenous physical and human capital endowments, (h, k).  
Section III considers how membership within the class structure might change if agents 
gain expanded access to credit from a microenterprise lending institution.  Section IV 
presents data on class structure mobility obtained first-hand through a credit survey 
carried out by this researcher of 358 small businesses owners in western Guatemala.  
Section V provides conclusions of the research and policy recommendations for targeted 
credit programs in developing countries. 
 
II. A MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS CLASS STRUCTURE FORMATION 
Following the general framework of Eswaran and Kotwal [1986], this paper presents a 
partial equilibrium model of an economy of utility-maximising agents.  These agents are 
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constrained by time and by their endowments of physical and human capital.  Utility is 
given, for simplicity, in additive form as a function of income and leisure: 
    ( ) ( )U Y Y v,l l= +      (1) 
with ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )′ > ′′ < ′ = ∞ ′ >v v v vl l0 0 0 1 0, , ,   and .  All agents have identical preferences 
over leisure.  The fact that utility is a linear function of income implies that all agents in 
the economy are risk-neutral. 
 Production is given as a function of capital used in production, K, (which may 
include land) and total efficiency units of labour, N.  
    ( )q F K N= θ ,      (2) 
The production function is linear homogeneous.  Derivatives of the function exhibit the 
normal conditions: ( )FN K, ⋅ > 0 , ( )FNN KK, ⋅ < 0 , and ( )FNK ⋅ > 0  .  The symbol θ represents a 
random shock with mean equal to one, which is intended to model uncertainty in 
production of the agent's enterprise. Because of this uncertainty, it is impossible for the 
owner of the enterprise to determine the amount of effort employed by hired workers.  
The market price of output is set equal to one. 
 The productivity of a worker is a function of the level of his human capital, h.  
This productivity is measured in efficiency units.6  The number of efficiency units of 
labour applied to production in an enterprise is composed of the efficiency units of an 
entrepreneur's own labour, x plus that from the labour of hired workers, z.  Human capital 
is distributed as an endowment across the economy to all agents i such that hi ∈ h h, .
7   
 Efficiency units of an agent's labour are given by ( )x hi= φ , where ( )φ ⋅  
transforms an agent's human capital into efficiency units with ( )′ >φ hi 0 .  The number of 
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efficiency units hired by an enterprise in this model is generally given by  ( )z h j
j
n
=
=
∑φ
1
, 
the sum of the number of hired workers, n, adjusted for the jth employed worker's level 
of human capital.  For simplicity, it is assumed that firms hire workers who are of a 
homogenous level of human capital hj.  The total number of efficiency units employed by 
the firm, N, is then equal to 
   ( ) ( )N x z h L n hi j= + = +φ φ      (3) 
where L is the fraction of an agent's time labouring in her own enterprise. 
 A larger stock of human capital has three beneficial effects for an agent:     
(1) It increases the efficiency units of some agent i labouring in his own firm by ( )′φ hi .   
(2) It lowers labour supervision costs by making agents better managers of employed 
labour.  (3) It increases the wage for the agent in the labour market.  Wages are a positive 
function of human capital, less a fixed supervision cost for all workers.  These are 
embodied in the wage function ( )w hi , and ( )w h' > 0 . 
 Time costs of supervision are given as a function of the supervising agent's human 
capital,8 and as a function of the number of wage labourers hired, or   
     ( )s s h n= ,      (4) 
where ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )s h n s h n s h n s h nn h nh nn, , , , , , ,> < < >0 0 0 0   and .   The convexity of the 
supervision function limits the scope of an enterprise despite linear homogeneity in 
production.   
 Each agent is constrained by one unit of time in each period.  This time can be 
spent working in the agent's own enterprise, L, supervising hired labour, s, in outside 
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wage employment, Lw, or enjoying leisure, l .  Thus the time constraint for each agent in 
the economy can be written as 
    ( )L L s h nw + + + =, l 1     (5) 
 Each agent is endowed with a fixed amount of capital $k  and a line of credit equal 
to B.  Added together, these equal k, the total amount of working capital available to the 
agent.  The capital $k  can be leased on the market at an interest rate r or used as capital in 
production, K.  As in the model of Eswaran and Kotwal, it is assumed here that all 
working capital outlays are incurred at the start of the production period.   In other words, 
an agent is unable to use future profits from his enterprise as collateral against a loan.  
The capital constraint faced by all agents is thus 
  ( ) ( ) ( )r k K w h L nw h Bi w j$ − + − + ≥ 0       (6) 
The capital constraint shows that net proceeds (costs) from leasing out (leasing) land 
added to wage income plus net borrowing must be greater than or equal to the total wages 
paid for hired labour.  In practice we would expect B to be highly correlated with $k  
because of the need for loans to be collateralised.  For simplicity, the option of financing 
production from past savings is excluded in this analysis. 
 By substituting equations (2) through (5) into (1), making them subject to the 
working capital constraint given in (6), and constraining Lw, L, n ≥  0, we obtain the 
following maximisation problem for each agent in the economy: 
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( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
max , $
( , ) ( $ )
, , , ,L L n K
j w j
w w j
w
U F K h L n h w h L rk nw h rK
v L L s h n r k K w h L nw h B
λ
φ φ
λ
=
  
+ + + − −
+ − − − + − + − +1     (7) 
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier.9  Differentiation of the maximisation problem in (7) 
yields the first-order conditions of (8) through (12): 
   ( )( ) ( ) 01 : =′−+ lvhwU
wL
λ                    (8)  
   ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,    : =′− lvhNKFU xL φ         (9) 
   ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 0,1,    : =′−+− lvnhshwhNKFU njjzn λφ       (10) 
   ( ) ( )U F K N rK K: ,  − + =1 0λ         (11)  
      ( ) ( ) ( ) 0ˆ  : =+−+− BhnwLhwKkrU jwλ                  (12)  
 These equations provide the framework for determining the labour activities of 
individual agents given their exogenous endowment (h, k).  There exists a unique utility-
maximising labour activity vector for each agent, given her capital endowment (h, k) and 
the exogenous parameters of the model.  In this analysis, like the Roemer and Eswaran-
Kotwal models, we have allowed three possible means of income generation: 
employment as a wage earner, working as a self-employed labourer, and hiring and 
supervising outside labour for work in one's own enterprise.  In utility-maximising 
equilibrium, each agent will optimally choose to engage in some combination of these 
different modes of labour activity.   
 The model thus generates the following eight possible combinations of labour 
activity for any agent, and their corresponding classes: 
(I) (0, 0, 0)  Systemically Unemployed 
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(II) (Lw, 0, 0)  Wage Earner 
(III) (Lw, L, 0)  Credit-Constrained Entrepreneur 
(IV) (0, L, 0)  Self-Employed Entrepreneur 
(V) (0, L, s)  Small Enterprise Owner 
(VI)  (Lw, L, s)  Entrepreneurial Wage Earner 
(VII) (Lw, 0, s)  Capitalist Professional 
(VIII) (0, 0, s)  Large Capitalist 
 The optimality conditions derived from (7) determine how agents will sort 
themselves out among these eight possible classes.  A mapping of these classes in the 
space of the endowment vector (h, k) is provided in Figure 1: 
k
h
Figure 1: Class Structure Map 
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 The complete mathematical proof of the class boundaries derived in the class 
structure map will not be given here, but is provided in Wydick [1996].  However, the 
intuition for the shape of the boundaries is the following:  The boundaries upon which an 
agent is indifferent between self-employment and labour supervision are downward-
sloping, since increases in either human capital or physical capital will make hiring in 
labour more attractive.  Determining the slope of other boundaries requires assumptions 
on the relative effects of increases in human capital on different labour activity.  In the 
class structure map in given in Figure 1 we assume that boundaries that separate wage 
activity and self-employment are upward-sloping as fixed supervision costs stemming 
from issues of moral hazard are likely to greatly reduce wages for low human capital 
agents, while agents with high levels of human capital would be able to command a 
premium wage in the labour market.  Thus we would expect that holding k fixed, 
increasing levels of h would induce labour market activity at the expense of self-
employed labour activity.  The relative effects of human capital on the return to wage 
labour and on labour supervision are more difficult to discern.  In Figure 1 we assume 
that increases in human capital have a neutral effect between reducing labour supervision 
costs and increasing wages. These latter assumptions, however, are not critical to the 
central analysis in this paper which will focus on the effect of increases in k to move 
individuals out of labour market activity and into entrepreneurial activity, and the 
combined affects of h and k in moving individuals from self-employment into labour 
supervision.  
Note that in contrast to previous models, this formulation generates a class of 
unemployed agents possessing physical and human capital that is so low (k1 at h) that the 
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return to non-labour activity exceeds the return to any of the three types of labour 
activity.  The boundaries for other classes begin at k2 through k4, at h and reflect an 
optimal allocation of labour activity given any endowment of h and k.  
 
III. THE IMPACT OF ACCESS TO CREDIT ON CLASS MEMBERSHIP  
 Substantial barriers in credit markets exist in developing countries that 
substantially inhibit capital accumulation in the informal sector.  Formal lending 
institutions have a lamentable record of channeling credit to the poor in LDCs [World 
Bank, 1989].  The primary reasons are asymmetric information barriers between 
borrowers and lenders which give rise to adverse selection and moral hazard problems in 
credit markets, and the high administrative costs to lenders for small loans 
[Stiglitz, 1990].  This combination of prohibitively high monitoring costs per loan and 
requirements for collateral prohibit a vast number of entrepreneurs from taking small 
loans in formal financial markets.  As development institutions have recognised the dire 
implications of these credit constraints on economic growth, there has been in recent 
years an explosion of credit programs in developing countries, targeting credit at those 
shut out of formal financial markets. 
 The analysis in the remainder of this paper will focus on two possible policy goals 
of credit expansion: (A) the effect of microenterprise lending on moving agents out of the 
class of credit-constrained entrepreneurs  (Lw, L, 0) into full-time entrepreneurial activity 
in the form of  (0, L, 0) and (0, L, s); and (B) the combined interaction of microenterprise 
lending with the formal schooling component of h on movement into labour supervision, 
or from (0, L, 0) to (0, L, s) and (0, 0, s).   
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A. Credit-Constrained Entrepreneurs 
 The class of credit-constrained entrepreneurs (Lw, L, 0) are clearly one of the 
groups of individuals most likely to benefit from a credit expansion program.  Movement 
of (Lw, L, 0) into (0, L, 0) through credit expansion is a worthy policy goal since it 
reduces the efficiency loss from moral hazard in wage labour, and also may improve 
income distribution by increasing the return to self-employed labour.  A relevant policy 
question is the extent to which better access to credit allows credit-constrained 
entrepreneurs to become fully self-employed.  Therefore, the first analysis of the 
Guatemalan data will be to determine if sufficient increases in credit expansion allow 
agents in the class of credit-constrained entrepreneurs to move into the class of self-
employed entrepreneurs.  This will not only provide a test of hypotheses developed in 
this paper (as seen in Figure 1), but also those previously put forth be Roemer [1982] and 
Eswaran and Kotwal [1986]. 
 
B. Employment Generation in the Informal Sector 
 A primary goal of development policy makers involved in microenterprise 
lending has been to stimulate job creation in impoverished regions through capitalisation 
of the informal sector.  Such a policy is designed to stimulate the demand for labour in 
such areas, creating new employment, while putting upward pressure on the wage rate.   
 A question then emerges: to what type of individual should credit be expanded to 
be consistent with this policy?  The prediction from the model is that sufficient increases 
in credit expansion will facilitate class structure mobility from (0, L, 0) to (0, L, s) and 
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from (0, L, s) to (0, 0, s).  Furthermore, as seen in Figure 1, fluidity of movement between 
these classes will be positively affected by the level of human capital of the agent, i.e. the 
class boundaries between  (0, L, 0) / (0, L, s), and  (0, L, s) / (0, 0, s) are downward-
sloping in (h, k) space.  The intuition behind this is the following: With an agent, for 
example, on the boundary of (0, L, 0) / (0, L, s), a slight increase in human capital 
endowment will make it marginally less costly to monitor a hired employee in terms of 
the opportunity cost of the agent's time.  A slight increase in physical capital endowment 
or credit makes any potential hired labour marginally more productive, and thus induces 
the agent to hire more labour.   
 However, it is almost tautological to argue that, after expanding credit access, we 
should observe agents with greater human capital expanding employment within their 
enterprises at a greater rate than those with lower levels of human capital.  As noted 
previously, there are more easily measurable components to human capital such as years 
of formal schooling, and less measurable components such as technical know-how, 
entrepreneurial drive, and personnel management skills.  What is most interesting and 
relevant in terms of policy implications is to focus on the more easily measurable 
component of human capital, formal schooling, to determine if this component of human 
capital that is observable to microenterprise lending institutions interacts with increased 
credit access to expand employment creation in informal sector enterprises.  If true, this 
would have important implications for microenterprise lending policy in the informal 
sector.  To maximise the increase in demand for labour in a region, loans could be 
targeted at those in the informal sector with higher levels of formal education.  If this 
hypothesis is not confirmed by the data, microenterprise programs may be able to meet 
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these goals just as easily by granting loans to those who may even be illiterate and 
struggle with the most basic mathematical skills, but are strong in the less measurable 
components of human capital mentioned above.    
 
IV. THE GUATEMALAN DATA 
  During the summer months of 1994 I designed and helped carry out first-hand 
survey of 358 entrepreneurs in western Guatemala, primarily in and around the rural 
towns of Quetzaltenango (population 96,000) and Totonicapan (population 9,000).  Of 
the 358 entrepreneurs interviewed in the survey, 236 were participants in a credit 
program operated by FUNDAP, a Guatemalan credit institution operating in the region 
that provides credit to small businesses.  The remaining 122 entrepreneurs were 
interviewed as a control group.  These entrepreneurs were located in areas not reached by 
FUNDAP and were highly credit-constrained. The surveys were administered at the 
entrepreneur's location of business. Within the sample, 258 of the interviewees were 
productores (light manufacturers) and 100 were commerciantes (retailers).   
 A classic problem with this kind of analysis is selection bias, i.e. borrowers in the 
credit program may share personal characteristics which are different than that of the 
control group.  Although it is difficult to control for unobservable characteristics between 
groups, Table 1 shows that at least the observable characteristics of the control group 
were quite similar to those of FUNDAP borrowers.10  The average age of both groups 
was approximately 36 years old.  Average (pre-credit) monthly sales were approximately 
US$371 for FUNDAP borrowers and US$432 for members of the control group.  
Average formal education was 3.26 years for FUNDAP borrowers and 4.86 years for 
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those in the control group.  Thus if differences exist between the control group and the 
treatment group, it would appear that the control group would be slightly a more educated 
and higher income group.  Of the entire sample interviewed 101 were female and 257 
were male, this ratio holding roughly the same for both groups.  
 The average size of a recipient's initial loan from FUNDAP was the equivalent of 
US$115, ranging from a minimum of $18 to a maximum in the sample of $545 (σ = $61).  
FUNDAP routinely rewards timely repayment by allowing outstanding balances to be 
rolled over into a subsequent loan and by regular increases in the size of loans.   
 The positive impact of the loans was obvious by simple examination of the 
change in gross revenues over time between the businesses with access to credit and 
those without.  The average time that the 236 FUNDAP borrowers had been receiving 
credits was 2.33 years.  Among FUNDAP borrowers, average gross revenues were $371 
per month before receiving loans from FUNDAP, but this figure had increased to $658 
by the time of the interviews.  In contrast, entrepreneurs in the control group realised an 
increase in average gross revenues from $432 per month to only $452 per month during 
the three years before the time of the interview.   
 While it is possible to argue that such differences could be caused by differences 
in unobservable characteristics between the treatment and control groups, close 
examination of the data indicate that this is unlikely.  If credit access were not largely 
responsible for differences in class structure mobility between groups, we would then at 
least expect to see similarities in changes over time between the most upwardly mobile 
members of control group and those of the treatment group.  However as Table 1 
indicates, while the top ten per cent of entrepreneurs in the control group showed a net 
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increase in hired labour of 1.9 employees over three years, this average was equaled by 
roughly the top fifty per cent of the treatment group.  Gross sales statistics confirm this 
phenomenon.  While the top ten per cent of the control group increased gross sales over 
the period in question by 125 per cent, the top ten per cent of the treatment group 
increased gross sales by 240 per cent.  Thus even upon comparing members of both 
groups who would be most likely to share unobservable characteristics (such as 
entrepreneurial drive, ambition, etc.) we see significantly higher upward mobility in 
entrepreneurs with access to credit. 
 How does the data on class structure mobility compare to the predictions of the 
model?  Tables IA-B to 3A-B illustrate class structure mobility in the treatment group 
and control groups in a Class Structure Mobility Matrix (CSMM).   These tables show 
class structure mobility among 107 productores in the sample who had been recipients of 
credit from FUNDAP for two to three years and class structure mobility over three years 
for another group of 56 productores who were owners of businesses in areas not yet 
reached by the credit program.   Because FUNDAP lends only to entrepreneurs with 
existing businesses, and because no instances of membership in (Lw, 0, s) were found in 
the survey, class membership in the sample was limited to the classes (Lw, L, 0), 
(Lw, L, s), (0, L, 0), (0, L, s), and (0, 0, s).
11    Table 2A presents a CSMM which 
compares the class mobility of the 107 productores who had access to credit from the 
lending institution for two to three years up to mid-1994 with a group of 56 productores 
in Table 2B who had no access to credit during the previous three years.    
     (Insert Tables 2A and 2B here) 
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 The greater class mobility by the group of entrepreneurs with access to credit is 
readily apparent by comparing Tables 2A and 2B.  While the largest elements of the 
CSMM in Table 2B tend to be located on the diagonal, indicating class stagnation, 
Table 2A portrays a relatively dynamic class structure in which the largest elements in 
each row tend to be located to the right of the diagonal.  Comparison between the two 
tables shows the greater rate at which entrepreneurs with access to credit moved out of 
part-time wage-earning activity into full-time self-employment than those without credit.  
The greatest difference between the groups is in mobility between the classes (0, L, 0) 
and (0, L, s).  While the vast majority of those with access to credit moved into labour-
supervising activity, only a minority of those without access to credit were able to move 
out of full-time self-employment.  The impact of access to credit on class structure 
mobility does, however, appear to wane at higher levels of capitalisation.  While class 
movement between (0, L, 0) and (0, L, s) is relativity fluid, mobility between (0, L, s) and 
(0, 0, s) is much less so, perhaps because of diminishing returns to labor or convexity in 
supervision costs.  
 The effect of formal schooling on class structure mobility can be seen in Tables 
3A-B and 4A-B.  The CSMMs presented in Tables 3A-B show the difference in class 
structure mobility between those with access to credit and the control group among 
entrepreneurs with four or more years of formal education. Tables 4A-B provide the same 
analysis of entrepreneurs with less than four years of formal education.    
   (Insert Tables 3A-B and Tables 4A-B here) 
 It is interesting to compare class structure mobility between entrepreneurs with 
four or more years of schooling and those with three or fewer years of formal schooling 
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(who both enjoyed access to credit) in the CSMMs in Tables 3A and 4A.  Note that the 
rate of movement into supervisory modes of labour activity was actually greater among 
the entrepreneurs with less formal education than for the more educated sub-group.  
Before receiving access to credit, 41.4 per cent of the more educated entrepreneurs were 
members of (0, L, s) or  (0, 0, s), and only 34.8 per cent of the less-educated group were 
members of (0, L, s) and  (0, 0, s), which is consistent with the class structure map 
presented in Figure 1.   However, at the end of the transition period, 71.2 per cent of the 
less-educated group were members of these ‘higher level’ classes, while this was true for 
only 65.8 per cent of the entrepreneurs with a greater amount of formal education!  In 
addition only one entrepreneur out of fourteen of the more educated group made the 
transition from (0, L, s) to (0, 0, s)  (to the ‘large capitalist’ class), while four out of 23 in 
the less educated group were able to make the transition.   
 A study of the tables shows that there also appears to be some degree of 
substitutability of human capital for physical in class structure mobility.  Upward 
mobility is clearly greater in the CSMM in Table 3B than in Table 4B.  Without access to 
credit, the more highly educated entrepreneurs appear to be able to expand businesses 
over time at a greater rate than the less-educated entrepreneurs without access to credit.  
Nevertheless, the Guatemalan data show class mobility among this group to be much less 
fluid than among the groups with access to credit. 
 Class stagnation is especially notable in the CSMM in Table 4B, which shows 
class movement among the less-educated productores without access to credit.  Not 
surprisingly, none of these entrepreneurs begins the period with membership in (0, 0, s).  
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Moreover, none of the entrepreneurs who begin in the class (0, L, s) is able to transition 
to (0, 0, s) by the end of the three-year period.   
 More formal testing of the model presented in Section III of this paper was carried 
out in the form of logit estimations taken on the probability of different measures of 
upward class structure mobility subject to measures of credit access and a vector of 
control variables.   Table 5 presents two different specifications which test for the effect 
access to credit and formal education (and the interaction between these variables) on 
class structure mobility.  The specification given in estimations (1) and (3) tests the effect 
of credit access (represented by a dummy variable) on FUNDAP borrowers who had 
been provided access to credit for either two or three years relative to changes in class 
structure mobility of the control group over three years.  
  The second type of specification, given in estimations (2) and (4), shows the 
impact of successive years of credit access on class structure mobility.  The gradual and 
sequential implementation of FUNDAP's microenterprise program into different village 
areas allowed for a kind of natural experiment on the effect of additional years of credit 
access.  FUNDAP borrowers had received access to credit for varying lengths of time.  
Some households happened to be located in areas in which FUNDAP had carried out 
lending operations since its foundation in 1988.   Other households were located in 
village areas where FUNDAP had recently initiated lending activity only within the last 
twelve months.  Others were in areas in which the institution had begun lending 
operations for the period in between.  What is more, an important part of FUNDAP's 
credit policy is to increase a borrower’s access to credit at a relatively slow pace over a 
sequence of loans.  Thus FUNDAP's slow and sequential introduction of credit into 
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different areas in western Guatemala, combined with its lending policy to its borrowers, 
provided a valuable instrument, years of credit access, for ascertaining the impact of 
varying degrees of access to credit.  The logit estimations in (2) and (4) are of the form 
   iyψββα +++=
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where ik represents years of credit access, ih  represents years of formal schooling, yi is a 
vector of control variables, α, β1 and β2  are estimated parameters, and ϕ is a vector of 
estimated parameters.  Estimated values of β1 and β2 are thus intended to capture the 
effect of credit access and the interaction of credit access with schooling on class 
structure mobility respectively.  Estimations in (1) and (3) substitute a dummy variable 
for ik  to represent credit access.  Estimation (5) uses Ordinary Least Squares to ascertain 
the effect of additional years of credit access on net changes in hired labour.     
 The logit estimations in (1) and (2) attempt to capture the impact of credit access 
and formal schooling on movement out wage labour activity (Lw) and into self-
employment.  The coefficient on credit access has the correct sign, and would indicate a 
very plausible 10 per cent increase in probability of moving out of wage labour activity 
for every additional year of credit access, but is statistically insignificant.  Years of 
formal schooling also appear to have an insignificant effect on movement out of wage 
labour activity; this may be expected, however, given the high opportunity cost of leaving 
the often higher-paying jobs associated with more years of formal education. 
 The estimations in (3) and (4) illustrate the highly significant effect of credit 
access in moving individual borrowers from self-employment into labour supervision.  
The estimations are carried out on 107 initially self-employed productores, and show that 
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two years of credit access results in a probability increase of 40 per cent of taking on 
hired labour.  Results also are indicative of diminishing returns to years of credit access; 
the squared term is negative and is statistically significant in estimation (4).  Again, 
formal schooling, if anything, is shown to have a negative effect on adding hired labour 
to an enterprise--a surprising yet interesting result which points to the importance of the 
less observable aspects of human capital relative to formal schooling in microenterprise 
management in developing countries.   The coefficient estimations in (5) again point to 
the beneficial effects of credit access on employment generation in microenterprises.  On 
average, three years of credit access produces a net increase of one full-time position for 
a hired labourer.  Moreover, although results indicate that younger borrowers may be 
more likely to create employment given access to credit, gender plays no significant role 
in employment generation.  The Guatemalan data indicate that enterprise expansion and 
upward class mobility is just as prevalent among women with access to credit as among 
men.  Thus the results from this study indicate that, given access to credit, a female 
entrepreneur with little or no formal education is as likely to add hired labour to an 
enterprise as a male entrepreneur with substantially higher levels of formal education, 
and is more likely to increase the scope of her enterprise given greater credit access. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS FOR CREDIT POLICY 
 This paper has shown that a class structure consisting of eight classes emerges 
endogenously based on individual endowments of human and physical capital.  Class 
structure mobility as portrayed in the Guatemalan data corroborate the hypothesis 
developed in this paper and in previous research that demonstrate the positive impact of 
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microenterprise lending on class structure mobility.  Access to credit clearly appears to 
foster movement from self-employment to labour supervision, although results in this 
paper cannot strongly confirm the effect of credit access in moving individuals from 
wage labour activity into self-employment.   
 The effect of human capital on the dynamics of class mobility among individuals 
who have been provided access to credit is more interesting, but somewhat less clear.  
Formal schooling appears to have very little impact on upward class mobility for small-
scale entrepreneurs in Guatemala.  Even the interaction between formal schooling, credit 
access, and upward class mobility is quite weak statistically.  We would expect greater 
levels of human capital to lower supervision and administrative costs so that credit 
targeted at highly educated entrepreneurs should foster more rapid enterprise growth.  
However, the Guatemalan data indicate that access to credit seems to unleash an 
entrepreneurial drive in certain individuals that is independent of formal education.  For 
these individuals supervision costs appear to be relatively flat up to perhaps three or four 
employees.  However, the data also indicate that convexities in supervision costs may 
kick in shortly after this point, i.e. the data show much more rapid class movement from 
self-employment to supervision of one to four workers than after this point. 
 Policy recommendations for development institutions follow from the results of 
this research.  Microenterprise lending institutions should not fear that lending to less-
educated borrowers would stifle their ability to generate employment in the informal 
sector.  A potential caveat to this, however, is that those with more schooling may be 
more likely to innovate and adopt new technology and ideas, and thus establish 
enterprises with greater potential for long-term growth.  However, the empirical findings 
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from the Guatemalan data suggest that in small, informal sector enterprises, formal 
education is not a good indicator of entrepreneurial human capital.  Instead, 
microenterprise programs should try to target credit at the Schumpeterian entrepreneur, 
the small-scale manufacturer with practical human resource management and 
administrative skills, and a predilection for expanding production and reaching into new 
markets. 
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Table 1--Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Control group treatment group 
 
years of credit access  
 2.32   0  
years of formal 
education  
 4.86   3.26  
 age   37.13   36.11  
fraction urban 
borrowers  
 46.57   24.05  
fraction male 
borrowers  
 75.34   76.89  
Fraction 
manufacturers  
72.60   76.79  
mean net hired labour 
added: 
    
--top 10%  1.94  3.34  
--top 20%  1.25  2.69  
--top 50%  0.80  1.92  
mean % increase in 
gross sales: 
    
--top 10%  125%  240%  
--top 20%  95%  150%  
--top 50%  45% 75% 
Source: 1994 Guatemala field survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
      Table 2A 
    Productores with Access to Credit:  
        Class Mobility over 2-3 Years 
 
     Subsequent Class Membership 
 
     (Lw, L, (Lw, L, (0, L, 0)  (0, L, s)  (0, 0, s)  total  
  (Lw, L, 0)  1  3  1  5 0 10 
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Initial  (Lw, L, s)  0  3  1  6  0  10  
Class  (0, L, 0)  2  2  15  28  0  47  
Membership  (0, L, s)  0  1  4  27  5  37  
  (0, 0, s)  0  0  0  0  3  3  
  total:  3  9  21  66  8  107  
  
      Table 2B 
     Productores with No Access to Credit: 
            Class Mobility Over 3 Years 
 
           Subsequent Class Membership 
  (Lw, L, 0) (Lw, L, s) (0, L, 0) (0, L, s) (0, 0, s) total 
  (Lw, L, 0)  1  0  1  2  0  4  
Initial  (Lw, L, s)  1  4  1  1  0  7  
Class  (0, L, 0) 0 1 15 6 0 22 
Membership  (0, L, s)  0  1  1  16  3  21  
  (0, 0, s)  0  0  0  1  1  2  
    2  6  18  26  4  56  
Source: 1994 Guatemala field survey. 
 
 
 
Table 3A 
Class Mobility of Productores with Four or More Years 
of Formal Schooling and with Access to Credit:  
 
     Subsequent Class Membership 
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  (Lw, L, 0) (Lw, L, s) (0, L, 0) (0, L, s) (0, 0, s) total 
  (Lw, L, 0)  1  2  0  3  0  6  
Initial  (Lw, L, s)  0  0  1  1  0  2  
Class  (0, L, 0)  0  2  6  8  0  16  
Membership  (0, L, s)  0  0  2  11  1  14 
  (0, 0, s)  0  0  0  0  3  3  
    1  4  9  23  4  41  
 
Table 3B 
Class Mobility of Productores with Four or More Years 
of Formal Schooling Lacking Access to Credit:  
 
     Subsequent Class Membership 
 
    (Lw, L, (Lw, L, (0, L, 0)  (0, L, s) (0, 0, s) total 
  (Lw, L, 0)  1  0  1  1  0  3  
Initial  (Lw, L, s)  1  1  1  0  0  3  
Class  (0, L, 0)  0  0  7  4  0  11  
Membership  (0, L, s)  0  1  1  9  3  14  
  (0, 0, s)  0  0  0  1  1  2  
    2  2  10  15  4  32  
Source: 1994 Guatemala field survey. 
 
Table 4A 
Class Mobility of Productores with Three or Fewer Years 
of Formal Schooling and with Access to Credit:  
 
      Subsequent Class Membership 
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                (Lw, L, 0) (Lw, L, s) (0, L, 0) (0, L, s) (0, 0, s) Total 
  (Lw, L, 0)  0  1  1  2  0  4  
Initial (Lw, L, s) 0 3 0 5 0 8 
Class  (0, L, 0)  2  0  9  20  0  31  
Membership  (0, L, s)  0  1  2  16  4  23  
  (0, 0, s)  0  0  0  0  0  0  
    2  5  12  43  4  66  
 
       Table 4B 
   Class Mobility of Productores with Three or Fewer Years 
    of Formal Schooling Lacking Access to Credit:  
 
      Subsequent Class Membership 
 
  (Lw, L, 0) (Lw, L, s) (0, L, 0) (0, L, s) (0, 0, s) total 
  (Lw, L, 0)  0  0  0  1  0  1  
Initial  (Lw, L, s)  0  3  0  1  0  4  
Class  (0, L, 0)  0  1  8  2 0 11 
Membership  (0, L, s)  0  0  0  7  0  7  
  (0, 0, s)  0  0  0  0  0  0  
    0  4  8  11  0  23  
Source: 1994 Guatemala field survey. 
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    Table 5--Estimation Results 
 
  Variable  (1) Movemen
t out of Lw  
(2) Movemen
t out of Lw  
(3) Movemen
t  into S  
(4) Movemen
t  into S 
(5) (OLS) 
Net Inc. H. 
Labour  
 constant  1.299 (0.37)
  
3.169 (1.20)
  
-0.826 (-
0.69)  
-1.617 (-
1.22)  
0.150 (0.3
9)  
years of  credit 
access  
  0.454 (0.62)
  
  1.235 (1.85)
*  
0.341 (2.7
6)***  
years of credit 
access squared  
  -0.030 (-
0.23) 
 -0.145 
(-0.84) 
-0.030 
(-1.73)* 
2-3 years credit 
access dummy  
1.183 (0.37)
  
  1.097 (2.09)
**  
    
years of formal 
education   
-0.144 (-
0.78)  
-0.151 (-
0.87)  
-0.052 (-
0.44)  
0.067 (0.47)
  
0.011 (0.4
0)  
years of educ  ×  
years of credit 
0.03 
(0.29) 
0.022 
(0.24) 
-0.052 
(-0.90) 
-0.126 
(-1.69)* 
-0.006 
(-0.54) 
age (years)  -0.028 (-
0.70)  
-0.032 (-
0.86)  
0.002 (0.07)
  
0.002 (0.08)
  
-0.010 (-
1.48)  
urban 
borrower (dummy)
  
0.837 (0.73)
  
0.092 (0.10)
  
-0.512 
(-0.75) 
-0.569 
(-0.75) 
-0.139 
(-0.76) 
male 
borrower (dummy)
  
0.099 (0.09)
  
-0.654 (-
0.79)  
0.227 (0.43)
  
0.156 (0.29)
  
0.089 (0.6
1)  
Manufacturer (du
mmy)  
-0.649 (-
0.37)  
-1.043 (-
0.63)  
    0.71 (4.02
)***  
 sample size:   36  
53 
 
107 
 
107 
 
171 
* Significant at the 10 percent level of confidence 
** Significant at the 5 percent level of confidence 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level of confidence 
 
 Source: 1994 Guatemala field survey. 
                                                           
1
 The Grameen Bank, operating in Bangladesh, for example now has a clientele of over 2 million borrowers 
while boasting a repayment rate of  99 per cent.   Muhammad Yunus, the founder of the Grameen Bank 
now estimates that there are approximately 6 million participants in microenterprise credit programs in 
developing and transitional economies (National Times, February 1997). 
 
2
 New York Times, January 26, 1997. 
 
3
  The study of class structure has its origins in Marxian dialectical thought.  The emergence of a class 
structure is a well-known a focal point in Marx's analysis of capitalist society (see Marx, Karl. Das Kapital. 
(1867) Chicago: Gateway, 1970).   Later both Lenin and Mao categorised the class divisions they observed 
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in their respective societies in terms of labour activity (see Lenin, Vladamir. The Development of 
Capitalism in Russia. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1899. and Mao Tse-Tung. ‘Analysis of the Classes in 
Chinese Society.’ in Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1926). 
 
4
 Clearly this welfare loss from supervision costs needs to be with balanced with the efficiency gains from 
the economies of scale found in many industries. 
 
5
 The statistics from the sample suggested that 0.2 per cent of the households responding fit the 
characteristics of the capitalist landlord, 14.3 per cent were rich farmers, 29.2 per cent were family farmers, 
8.7 per cent were poor peasants, and 35.9 per cent matched the description of landless labourers.  The 
residual 11.7 per cent were made up of those who engaged in no income earning activity during the sample 
period, or were involved in all three of the income-earning activities in Roemer's model, a proposition 
which was excluded by Roemer's assumption that own labour and hired labour were perfect substitutes.  
 
6
 In this model ‘efficiency units’ refers to a worker's potential productivity given his level of human capital; 
it is not related to the degree of effort used in work. 
 
7
 The rationale for treating adult human capital as an exogenous endowment in this model is the following:  
First, because of the limited resources of most LDCs, opportunities for educational investment are far from 
evenly distributed across the population; the supply and location of educational institutions is  heavily 
influenced by circumstance and political whim (Foster 1983).  This is particularly the case in Guatemala.  
Moreover, in the narrower context of this research, since FUNDAP's stated objective is to lend equally 
freely to borrowers regardless of educational background, access to credit and educational level are 
independent of one another, and can be viewed as co-determinants of class structure membership. 
 
8
 For notational simplicity the subscript i will be dropped from this point forward although for clarity the 
subscript j will continue to represent hired agents. 
  
9
 The parameter θ reflecting uncertainty in production will be suppressed in the remainder of the analysis as 
it does not play a substantial role with the absence of risk-aversion in the utility functions of agents. 
 
10
 One might think that recipients of FUNDAP loans might be a self-selected sample of aggressive 
entrepreneurs eager to expand their businesses relative to a more passive control group.  However, during 
the survey, members of the control group in fact were highly enthusiastic about the possibility of receiving 
credit from FUNDAP, but to that point had been denied credit due to their location in areas yet unserved by 
the credit program.   
 
11
 Since an entrepreneur's labour activity in firms with approximately five or more employees was observed 
to become primarily supervisory and administrative, these individuals were classified as (0, 0, s). 
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